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COMMODIFYING JUSTICE FOR
GLOBAL FREE TRADE:
THE PROPOSED HAGUE JUDGMENTS

CONVENTION©
By

VAUGHAN BLACK*

A notable omission from the legal apparatus for
international free trade is a multilateral agreement on
court jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign country
judgments. However, negotiations toward such an
international convention are in progress. This paper
explores the background to those discussions. It
examines the current draft of the proposed judgments
convention with particular reference to the way in
which implementation of that draft would affect
Canadians engaged in the practice of international
commercial litigation. It concludes with a discussion of
current sticking points in the negotiations, and with
commentary on the judgment enforcement scene and
the implications of failure to achieve international
uniformity in that area.

Une omission remarquable du regime juridique du
libre-6change international est I'absence d'un accord
multilateral en matiare de la competence des cours et
de la mise en application des jugements emanant d'un
pays etranger. Toutefois, des negociations pour dtablir
un tel accord international sont en cours. Cet article
consid~re le contexte de ces discussions et examine
l'avant-projet propos6 de la convention sur la
competence et les jugements 6trangers en mati~re civile
et commerciale, avec emphase particuli6re sur la fagon
dont la mise en vigueur de cet avant-projet pourrait
affecter les canadiens oeuvrant dans la pratique du
litige en droit commercial international. En conclusion,
I'article aborde les difficult6s rencontr6es pendant les
n~gociations et I'auteur fait des commentaires au sujet
de la mise en application des jugements et les
repercussions de ne pas arriver h l'uniformit6
internationale dans ce domaine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At least outside Quebec, Canadian conflict of laws has been
mainly a judicial creation. Despite continuing statutory encroachments
into a range of historically common law domains, legislatures have
traditionally seemed content to leave to the judiciary the task of sorting
out questions of choice of law, enforcement of foreign judgments (both
interprovincially and internationally), certain elements of adjudicatory
jurisdiction, and most aspects of cross-border civil procedure, including
anti-suit injunctions, international Mareva injunctions, negative
declarations, forum non conveniens, and lis alibipendens.1 This judicial
pre-eminence is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that in the
United Kingdom, the jurisdiction from which Canada inherited the bulk
of its private international law, the field has become predominantly a
legislative one. This is due in part to statutes implementing treaty
obligations arising from the United Kingdom's membership in the
European Union,2 but as well there is recent homegrown United
Kingdom legislation dealing with conflict of laws, notably a 1995 statute
dealing with both choice of law in tort and the recognition of foreign
marriages. 3
But, bit by bit, the Canadian scene is changing. It is no longer
uncommon to see statutes that feature provisions purporting to specify

1 A case on these last two matters is on its way to the Supreme Court of Canada: Westec
Aerospace Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co. (1999), 173 D.L.R. (4th) 498 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.

granted 20 April 2000, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 298, online: QL (SCCA).
2 The two most significant are the 1980 European Community Convention on the Law
Applicable to ContractualObligations,19 June 1980, 23 O.J. L. 266, 19 I.L.M. 1492 (entered into
force 1 April 1991, brought into force in the U.K. by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990
(U.K.), 1990, c. 36) and the Brussels Convention discussed infra, note 34.
3 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (U.K.), c. 42, ss. 5-8
(Matrimonial), ss. 9-15 (Tort). Note also the ForeignLimitation PeriodsAct 1984 (U.K.) 1984, c. 16.
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their territorial application. To take a few examples, there are sections
dealing with choice of law in the PersonalProperty Security Act in force in
each Canadian common law jurisdiction 4 in most provinces'
matrimonial property legislation,5 and in each provincial International
Sales of Goods Act embodied pursuant to Canada's 1992 adoption of the
United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of
Goods.6 Provincial statutes dealing with child custody now feature
provisions dealing with territorial jurisdiction, 7 as does some consumer
protection legislation. 8 Recent amendments to federal bankruptcy
legislation have sought to address some of the thorny issues presented by
insolvencies of transnational corporations. 9 In short, for better or worse,
Canadian legislators are coming to perceive that questions of crossborder co-ordination of private law need not be left to judges deciding
individual cases, but instead present an appropriate site for legislative
activity.
No single factor explains this development. In part it is but
another sign of the expansion of the legislative domain that has
characterized the twentieth century. This is augmented by a widely
shared sense that, at least in some areas of conflict of laws, courts have
not been notably successful in reaching acceptable solutions. With its
atavistic attraction to latin maxims, judge-made conflict of laws remains
an egregiously formalistic enterprise, frequently generating contentious
results and occasionally prompting judicial entreaties for statutory
salvation.' 0
Another factor contributing to growing legislative inroads into
judge-made conflict of laws has been laws enacted pursuant to Canada's
adoption of multilateral treaties, most notably those originating at the
Hague Conference on Private International Law. In this regard, as
elsewhere in Canadian conflict of laws, the influence of Jean-Gabriel
4 See, for example, PersonalPropertySecurityAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. P-10, ss. 5-8.
5 See, for example, FamilyLaw Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, s. 15.
6 Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods 11 April 1980, 1511 U.N.T.S. 77,

19 I.L.M. 668 (entered into force 1 August 1988; accession by Canada 1 May 1992) [hereinafter
CISG]. For an example of provincial implementing legislation, see InternationalSale of Goods Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. 1-10.
7 See, for example, Children'sLaw Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-12, s. 22 [hereinafter CLRA].
8 See ConsumerProductsWarranty andLiabilityAct, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, s. 27.
9 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 12 [hereinafter
BIA]. See ss. 267-75.
10 See, for example, Grimes v. Cloutier (1989), 69 O.R. (2d) 641 at 661 (C.A.); and Going v.
Reid BrothersMotor Sales Ltd. (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 201 at 213 (H.C.J.).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 38 No. 2

Castel has been significant. Although the Hague Conference has been
labouring at the unification of rules of private international law since its
creation in 1893, Canada was a latecomer to that effort, not joining until
1968. It might well have remained a non-participant to this day had it not
been for Castel's influential 1967 contribution to the Canadian Bar
Review. That article sought to introduce the Canadian legal community
to the mission and history of the Conference. It ended with this appeal:
The United States of America is now a member of the Conference. When will it be
Canada's turn? Let us not wait any longer. Let us join the Hague Conference. This could
be a most desirable Centennial project in the field of law. It would show to everyone who
is interested in law that Canada's legal horizons and objectives are world-wide. Canada
should not miss the opportunity to attend the 1968 Session of the Conference. 11

Canada joined the following year, and since that time has been a regular
and active participant. Indeed, Canada was the initiator of what is widely
regarded as the Hague Conference's most important and successful
project of recent decades, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
InternationalChildAbduction12 (in force in all provinces 13). Due in part
to difficulties of federal-provincial co-ordination, Canadian adoption of
Hague Conference conventions has been less frequent than some of that
organization's advocates might have hoped, consisting to date of the
ratification and implementation of four such treaties,1 4 only two of which

11 J.-G. Castel, "Canada and the Hague Conference on Private International Law: 1893-1967"
(1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 1 at 34 [hereinafter "Canada and the Hague"].
12
Convention on the Civil Aspects of Intemational ChildAbduction, 25 October 1980, Can. T.S.
1983 No. 35 (entered into force 1 December 1983, ratification by Canada 2 June 1983) [hereinafter
CCA].
13 See CLRA, supra note 7, s. 46(2) and its equivalent in other provinces.
14 In addition to the child abduction convention mentioned supra note 12, the others are: (1)
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and ExtrajudicialDocuments in Civil or Commercial
Matters, 15 November 1965, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 2 (entered into force 10 February 1969, accession by
Canada 1 May 1989), in force in all provinces and territories, and in the Federal Court of Canada;
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on theirRecognition, 1 July 1985, Can. T.S 1993 No.
2, 23 I.L.M. 1389 (entered into force 1 January 1992, ratification by Canada 1 January 1993), in
force in most provinces (for a list of implementing legislation and an analysis of the convention see
J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1997) at 544-49
[hereinafter Conflict of Laws]); and Convention on Protection 'of Children and Co-operation it
Respect of IntercountryAdoption of Children, 32 I.L.M. 1134 (entered into force 1 May 1995,
ratification by Canada 1 April 1997) [hereinafter CPC] which, like the trusts convention, is not in
force in all provinces (for details on implementing legislation and an analysis of the convention see
Conflict ofLaws, supra at 448-49).
A number of the Hague Conference's earlier conventions, in particular ones negotiated
before Canada joined in 1968, lack federal state clauses. Thus, since most of them deal with matters
within provincial legislative competence, Canada could not accede to them as a practical matter
unless all provinces were prepared to implement them. That is not always easily achieved.
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are in force throughout the country. However, adoption of other of the
Hague Conference's conventions is under consideration and will further
change the Canadian private international legal landscape in the future.
There is one project under way at the Hague Conference with
the potential to provoke a legislative change in Canadian private
international law greater than any witnessed to date. Since the mid1990s, Canada and the other member states have been engaged in the
negotiation of a convention which, if successfully concluded and
implemented, would radically alter the rules governing litigation of those
civil and commercial matters with any significant international
connection. This project is the proposed Hague judgments convention,
and it is the goal of this article to describe and comment on that work. I
begin by situating this proposed treaty in the context of existing
multilateral agreements for co-ordination of worldwide commerce. That
is followed by a brief outline of the current Canadian law in this area.
Against that background I offer an account of the shape of the most
recent draft of the convention,1 5 with some observations on how existing
Canadian law would have to be altered if we were to adopt it, and also a
discussion of the current sticking points in its negotiation. I conclude
with commentary on what is at stake for Canada in these deliberations,
and on the discourse of the internationalization of commercial justice.
II. THE PLACE OF COURT JURISDICTION AND
ENFORCEMENT IN THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE
OF GLOBAL COMMERCE
Developments in communication and transportation technology
have facilitated the internationalization of economic activity and have
been accompanied by a variety of changes in the legal arrangements
relating to cross-border movement of goods, services, investment, and
(sometimes) persons embodied in a number of multilateral conventions
implemented by the world's trading nations. Pre-eminent among those

15 Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law on 30 October 1999 [hereinafter the Draft Convention]. The Draft Convention

may be found in the American Law Institute's InternationalJurisdictionand Judgments Project,
Report of April 14, 2000 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute Press, 2000) at 41 [hereinafterALl

Report], online:
Hague
Conference
on
Private
International
<http:/lwww.hch.net/elconventions/draft36e. html> (date accessed: 10 July 2000).

Law

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 38 No. 2

has been the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO).16
In addition, there are a variety of comprehensive regional trading
arrangments, such as the North American Free Trade Association17 and
the European Union, and also a number of multilateral conventions on
specific topics. These have gone a long way to standardizing laws relating
to such matters as international shipping contracts,18 international sales
of goods, 19 and international air travel. 20 Finally, there are the
arrangements made by non-governmental organizations to regularize
various types of commercial practice, such as the standard letters of
credit promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce. 21
Recent years indeed have witnessed measurable amounts of rain
on this parade. The stalled progress on the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, last year's inconclusive developments at the Seattle round of
the WTO, and the protests at the World Bank meeting in Washington in
April 2000 are the most visible examples. Still, even taking those
setbacks into account, few would disagree that, at least for the near
future, nation states will continue to achieve some success in developing
and implementing multilateral arrangements to facilitate global trading.
A notable omission from the preceding list of agreements is an
effective multilateral agreement dealing with two key aspects of
international commercial litigation, the (contingently) related questions
of (1) which countries' courts should properly hear which international
private law disputes (i.e., shared standards of direct adjudicatory

16

FinalAct Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of MultilateralTrade Negotiations, 15

April 1994,33 I.L.M. 1 (entered into force 1 January 1995).
17 North American Free Trade Association Between the Government of the United States of
America, the Government of Canadaand the Government of the United Mexican States, 17 December

1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA ].
18 Carriageof Goods by WaterAct, S.C. 1993, c. 21. Schedule 1 to that statute sets out the
Hague Rules, Schedule 2 sets out the Hague-Visby Rules, and schedule 3 (not yet in force) sets out
the Hamburg Rules.
19

CISG, supra note 6.

20 See Carriage byAirAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26, sched. 1. This act implements the Warsaw
Convention: Conventionfor the Unification of CertainRules Relating to InternationalCarriageby Air,

12 October 1929, Can. T.S. 1947 No. 15 (entered into force 13 February 1933, accession by Canada
8 September 1947) as amended by protocol at The Hague 1955, Can. T.S. 1964 No. 29 [hereinafter
Warsaw Convention].
21 International Chambers of Commerce Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits, 1993 Rev. ICC Pub. No. 500. This is not a treaty, but rather a non-governmental
codification that has been almost universally adopted.
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jurisdiction), and (2) cross-border enforcement of court judgments. 22
However, negotiations toward a multilateral convention on both these
questions are in progress-albeit a progress that, at least in terms of the
popular press and the groups that oppose globalization, has received far
less attention than the WTO or the World Bank.
Starting in the mid 1990s, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law has functioned as the forum for work on a projected
worldwide convention on transborder enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters. This proposed judgments convention would
provide not just for a standardized regime, but, broadly paralleling
elimination of protectionist barriers for goods and services, for greatly
liberalized international recognition of commercial judgments. That is, it
would provide not only uniformity, but a uniformity achieved by the
reciprocal removal or at least lowering of many existing obstacles to
transfrontier judgment enforcement. The result would be that persons
with property in one country would find such property considerably
more vulnerable than it currently is to collection processes invoked
pursuant to judgments rendered in member states on the far side of the
globe. Conversely, court judgments rendered in Canada would be far
more likely to enjoy recognition in Europe, China, Japan, the antipodes,
and elsewhere. In fact, the change would be more complicated: since the
new rules would apply only to matters within the convention's scope, its
implementation here would bifurcate Canadian law, creating one
scheme for enforcement in Canada of court judgments from some
countries, and leaving another recognition regime (presumably the
existing one) for judgments outside its scope and for all judgements from
non-participating countries.
Of possibly greater significance, the proposed judgments
convention would prescribe mandatory rules for direct jurisdiction. It
would dictate which civil suits should be entertained (and which should
not) by which country's judges. Accordingly, if implemented in Canada,
the convention would have the effect of recasting the service ex juris
regimes found in provincial rules of court and thus rendering uniform
the current provincial patchwork of adjudicatory jurisdiction. It would
also alter certain long-standing common law rules on this subject and
22 In fact, the Hague Conference did produce a convention dealing with judgment
enforcement: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
CommercialMatters, 1 February 1971 (entered into force 20 April 1979), online: Hague Conference
on Private International Law <http://hcch.net/e/conventions/textl6e.html> (date accessed: 10 July
2000). However, it attracted minimal interest, in part because it was pre-empted by the Brussels

Convention (see infra, note 34), and in part because of its considerable complexity, it attracted
minimal interest.
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likewise restructure the tests for forum non conveniens and lis alibi
pendens.
I do not suggest that the relative lack of attention to the
proposed judgments convention-as compared with, say, the public
debate and scholarly scrutiny devoted to the WTO process or the
proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment-is in any respect
misplaced. Assessed by its probable impact on the general push toward
globalization, the judgments convention is less significant, both for the
proponents of international capitalism and for those who seek to derail
or retard it. There are a number of explanations for why a worldwide
arrangement for markedly freer movement of court judgments across
national frontiers would represent a less important development than
one might at first expect.
Chief among these explanations is the fact that today's preferred
dispute resolution mechanism for many international commercial
transactions is arbitration. Pursuant to the New York Convention,23 to
which Canada and more than 100 other countries are party, commercial
arbitrations are already enforceable among the world's major trading
nations. Under the federal and provincial legislation implementing this
treaty, 24 the grounds on which Canada may decline to lend its support to
enforcing an arbitration held in, for example, London, Paris, or
Singapore, are few and narrow. Thus, under the auspices of the New
York Convention, a significant portion of commercial dispute resolution
has already been internationalized.
In addition, 'there are other isolated areas where treaties and
implementing legislation have already created a measure of coordination. For example, there exists an array of tax treaties which,
although they do not generally provide for international enforcement of
judgments in tax matters, at least address the important practical issue of
double taxation. As well, there already has been an appreciable

23 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralAwards, 10 June 1958,
Can. T.S. 1986 No. 43 (entered into force 7 June 1959, accession by Canada 10 August 1986)
[hereinafter New York Convention]. Presumably one of the attractions of arbitration as an
international dispute resolution mechanism is the very existence of the cross-border enforcement
facilitated by this convention. That is, if there was comparable international enforcement of court
judgments, some persons who currently contract for arbitration might prefer to forgo arbitration
clauses in favour of litigation.
24 United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, S.C. 1986, c. 21. For discussion of that
convention and references to provincial legislation see Conflict of Laws, supra note 14 at 334-37.
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globalization of the law respecting children, 25 so that court dispositions
dealing with cross-border adoptions and international child custody
disputes enjoy considerable transborder recognition. Finally, as noted
above, the recent amendments to the BA26 have attempted to effect a
greater co-ordination in the area of international insolvencies.
Still, even allowing for the fact that the developments just
mentioned have rendered the question of cross-border enforcement of
court judgments in civil and commercial matters. less crucial than might
otherwise be the case, the matter is not inconsequential. The lack of
international standards on court jurisdiction and judgment enforcement
amounts to a significant missing link in the system for resolution of
international commercial disputes.2 7 Even with the growth of alternative
dispute resolution, considerable amounts of civil and commercial dispute
resolution does end up before courts. Not all international contracts
have provisions for arbitration, and even when they do, questions may
arise about the scope of the arbitrators' authority, and those questions
might have to be resolved by judges. In addition, there are situations
where the parties have not had an effective opportunity for ex ante
bargaining, and hence no possibility of a pre-negotiated arbitration
clause relating to the issue that has arisen. The prime examples here are
non-market torts and property (including intellectual property)
disputes-tort claims in particular present a persistent problem for
cross-border enforcement. In short, the lack of binding global standards
on court jurisdiction and enforcement is a significant gap in the current
system of international commercial arrangments, and closing that gap
would be a development of some consequence.
To some it comes as a surprise that no worldwide arrangement
for cross-border judgment recognition exists. With global agreements
relating to cross-border trade in goods and services, it seems a curious
omission from this set of international arrangements that the countries
of the world have not yet put in place the apparatus for a standardized
approach to enforcement of foreign court judgments. After all, many of
those judgments are just the resolution of disputes arising from

25 For fuller discussion see S. Detrick and P. Vlaardingerbroek, eds., Globalizationof Child
Law: The Role of the Hague Conventions (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1999) and A. Dyer, "The

Internationalization of Family Law" (1997) 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 625. And in this connection see
the Canadian legislation implementing the CCA and CPC respectively, supranotes 12 and 14.
26
Supra note 9.
27 A. Straus, "Where America Ends and the International Order Begins: Interpreting the

Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments" (1998) 61 Alta. L. Rev. 1237 at 1238.
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transactions which themselves flow relatively unimpeded across national
frontiers and do so in light of standardized binding agreements. So why
should the ultimate efficacy of an important part of the mechanism for
resolving disputes arising from such agreements be left to unilateral
decisions of states?
Some explanations may emerge below, but for the moment let us
focus on the existing situation. Canada has implemented just a single
agreement on mutual enforcement of court judgments, a bilateral one
with the United Kingdom. 28 That arrangement is not comprehensive; 29
nor is it especially significant, since it mainly codifies the common law as
it existed in both countries at the time it was negotiated. A second such
bilateral agreement was entered into with France in 1996 but has not yet
been implemented 3 0 Each of these treaties is confined to the question of
enforcement. Neither has any effect on the question of initial
adjudicatory jurisdiction, and although there are some limited
arrangements touching on jurisdiction, such as the Warsaw Convention's
arrangments for adjudicating claims arising out of international air
travel, 31 as well as some bilateral treaties dealing with the mechanics of
service of judicial documents,32 Canada is not signatory to any general
treaty dealing with court jurisdiction. Similarly the United States, the
world's largest international trader, has no international agreements
dealing with enforcement of court judgments in commercial matters or
with judicial jurisdiction. 33
28 By "not comprehensive" I mean that parties are not required to resort to the enforcement

mechanism set out in the legislation implementing the convention. Judgment creditors who cannot
bring their judgments within the scope of the convention can and do obtain cross-border
enforcement at common law.
29 Convention Between Canadaand the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and CommercialMatters, 24

April 1984, Can T.S. 1987, No. 29 (entered into force 1 January 1987). The federal government
implemented this by the Canada-UnitedKingdom Civil and CommercialJudgments Convention Act,

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-30 (in respect of the Federal Court of Canada), and all the common law provinces
and the territories have likewise implemented it.
30 Convention Between Canada and France on the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and
CommercialMatters 1996 and on Mutual LegalAssistance in Maintenance, 10 June 1996, P.C. 1996-

813.
31

Supra note 20, art. 28.

32 For a list and a discussion see Conflict of Laws, supra note 14 at 221-23.
33 In 1976 the U.S. ind U.K. attempted to negotiate a bilateral agreement on judgment
enforcement, but it foundered due to concerns of U.K. insurance companies about the size of
American damages awards (regarding this see the discussion, infra, Part IV) and was never
concluded. See P. Hay & R. Walker, "The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention

Between the United States and the United Kingdom" (1976) 11 Tex. Int'l L.J. 421; and P. North,
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The notable exception to this lack of co-ordination is the
European Union. The founding members of that organization perceived
at the outset that liberal enforcement of each other's judgments was a
crucial adjunct to the cross-border movement of goods and services that
was at the heart of their union, and concluded among themselves a
multilateral arrangement both to facilitate such enforcement and to limit
jurisdiction inter se.3 4 As the European Union has expanded,
participation in that "free trade zone for judgments" has been required
for new members. 3 5 But such arrangements are not the rule elsewhere.
For instance, NAFTA embodies no such regime.36 In the absence of any
truly global scheme of binding standards of court judgment enforcement
it is helpful to take note, briefly and by way of background, of the
manner in which Canada's law on this subject has been formed.

"The Draft U.K/U.S. Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint" (1979) 1 Nw. J. Int'l Law &
Bus. 219.
34 In article 220 of the Treaty of Rome, which founded the European Community, the original
six member countries agreed to work for "the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal
recognition of judgments of courts or tribunals .... This led to the Convention on Jurisdictionand
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 27 September 1968, 21 O.J. L. (No.
C97/1) 36, 8 IL.M. 229 (entered into force 1 February 1973) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. The
Supreme Court of Canada took notice of the BrusselsConvention in MorguardInvestments Ltd. v. De
Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 [hereinafter Morguard]. In modifying the common law of Canada to
lower barriers to enforcement of intra-Canadian judgments, the court observed, at 1100, that the
model provided by the European Union provided a persuasive analogy.
35 Convention on Jurisdictionand Eiforcement of Judgments in Civil and CommercialMatters,
16 September 1988, O.J. L. (No. L319) 9, 28 I.L.M. 620 (entered into force 1 January 1992).
36 Supra note 17. Nor does the free trade agreement between Canada and Chile: CanadaChile: Free Trade Agreement, 5 December 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1067 (entered into force 4 July 1997), see
also the Canada-ChileFree TradeImplementationAct, S.C. 1997, c. 14, s. 32. These treaties and their
implementing legislation do provide for resolution of disputes between states parties and certain
investors, and those awards are enforceable within the free-trade zone, but the treaties have no
general judgment enforcement or jurisdiction provisions regarding general civil litigation.
The only other multilateral enforcement convention of note is the so-called Montevideo
Convention in force among Mexico and a number of South American states: Inter-American
Convention on ExtratenitorialValidity of ForeignJudgments and ArbitralAwards, 8 May 1979, 1439
U.N.T.S. 87 (entered into force 14 June 1980). It deals with judgment enforcement, but not with the
participating countries' rules of direct jurisdiction.
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III. GENESIS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION
A. The Courts
It is not my goal here to provide a detailed description of
Canadian rules of enforcement of foreign country judgments. That is
available elsewhere. 37 However, a few comments on the manner in which
that law has been formed and on the consequences of that formation will
be helpful in understanding both the birth of the Hague project and
what is at stake for Canada in the completion of that enterprise.
Like other countries, Canada does not enforce all foreign
judgments. It gives effect to some but declines to recognize others.
Those that are refused enforcement are ineffective here, and if Canada
is the only place the judgment debtor has property, then a foreign
judgment we decline to enforce is useless to the judgment creditor. In
the common law provinces of Canada the law on this subject has been
made mostly by judges. 38 Foreign judgment recognition has been
conceived of as a common law right of action: a judgment creditor in
whose favour a foreign country court proceeding has gone and who
needs to enforce the resulting foreign judgment in Canada, brings an
action here on the judgment. A decade ago, Canadian rules respecting
that cause of action were modified by the Supreme Court of Canada. In
its much discussed judgment in Morguard,39 the Court adopted an
avowedly instrumentalist and economic perspective. It began its analysis
by noting that the question of which foreign judgments should be
recognized in Canada is a matter entirely within Canada's unilateral
control; that is, it is dictated neither by any binding precepts of public
international law nor by any obligations Canada owes to private

37 Conflict of Laws, supranote 14 at 269-322.
38 In 1933 the Uniform Law Conference of Canada codified those judge-made rules in the
model ForeignJudgmentsAct. This was adopted by just two provinces: Saskatchewan, in the Foreign
Judgments Act, R.S.S. 1978, R.S.S. 1978, c. F-18; and New Brunswick, in the Foreign JudgmentsAct,
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-19.
39
Supra note 34. For commentary see J.-G. Castel, "Recognition and Enforcement of a SisterProvince Default Money Judgment: Jurisdiction Based on Real and Substantial Connection" (1991)
7 B.F.L.R. 111; P. Glenn, "Foreign Judgments, the Common Law and the Constitution: De Savoye v.
MorguardInvestments Ltd." (1992) 37 McGill L.J. 537; J. Blom, Case Comment (1991) 70 Can. Bar
Rev. 733; V. Black & J. Swan, "New Rules for the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard
Investments Ltd v. De Savoye" (1991) 12 Advocates' Q. 489; and P. Finkle & S. Coakeley, "Morguard
Investments Limited: Reforming Federalism from the Top" (1991) 14 Dal. L.J. 340.
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individuals who have obtained judgments from other states' courts. 40
However, having embraced that starting point, the Court immediately
went on to note that, as a practical matter in the new global economy,
Canada would benefit by granting liberal enforcement to foreign
judgments. Such a practice would enable us to avoid isolation and
participate more fully in international trade.
The Supreme Court's analysis in Morguard represents its core
pronouncement on how Canadian judges should modify the common
law in light of the changing world economic order. Such response, in the
words of Mr. Justice La Forest, should be conditioned by "the need in
modern times to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across
state lines in a fair and orderly manner," 41 a need that should prompt
courts to select rules "that will best promote suitable conditions of
interstate and international commerce," 42 which today means that the
law "must be adjusted in light of the changing world order." 43 In the
Court's unanimous view, new economic circumstances leave judges no
option but to reconfigure the rules respecting enforcement of foreign
court judgments: "The business community operates in a world economy
and we correctly speak of a world community even in the face of
decentralized political and legal power. Accommodating the flow of
wealth, skills and people across state lines has now become
imperative."44
Two points are worthy of note in connection with the Supreme
Court's assessment of how judges should respond to the increasing
internationalization of commerce. The first is the Court's agnosticism as
to whether globalization of economic activity is a good or bad thing. For
all of Mr. Justice La Forest's statements about the momentous change in
the world economic order and its attendant effects on political power, he
is strikingly mute about whether that development is a welcome one. He
simply observes that it is an unavoidable datum of great significance and
thus something that judges must take into account.45 The result of
40

Moruard,supra note 34 at 1095-96.

41 Ibid. at 1096.
42

bit at 1097, quoting H. Yntema, "The Objectives of Private International Law" (1957) 35

Can. Bar Rev. 721 at 741.
43

Morguard,supra note 34 at 1097.

44

Ibid. at 1098.

45 Perhaps it should come as no great surprise to see the Supreme Court of Canada
pronounce that judges, in articulating the common law, should attempt to facilitate global
capitalism. This may be no more than another instance of private law's long-standing role of

fulfilling the reasonable expectations of parties to contracts and protecting justified reliance. Some

250

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

38 No. 2

Morguard and its progeny has been that in the 1990s foreign judgments
have become far more easily enforcedble in this country than they
previously were. This development is contemporaneous with, and
analogous to, Canada's lowering of trade barriers pursuant to NAFTA
and the WTO, except that it is unaccompanied by mandated reciprocal
action by other states.
The second point follows from the preceding comment: the
success (as measured by economic benefit to Canada) of the Court's
gambit appears to depend on other countries taking notice of Canada's
willingness to enforce their judgments and then responding by
recognizing that their own enlightened self-interest (or perhaps just a
spirit of fair play) should prompt them to follow suit and lower their
barriers to recognition of Canadian judgments. Such consequences are
hardly guaranteed. It bears noting that Canada is not alone in this.
American laws on enforcement of foreign country judgments were
likewise devised mostly by judges. Like Canada's, they do not make
relevant any reciprocity of treatment of American judgments by the
country in which the proffered foreign judgment originates, 46 and on the
whole they permit liberal enforcement of foreign judgments. American
commentators have attributed their country's approach to enforcement
of foreign judgments to the same tactic espoused by the Supreme Court
in Morguard: "U.S. courts give respect to foreign judgments not only
because finality is a fair and efficient policy, but also because U.S. courts
47
hope to encourage abroad similar respect for their own judgments."
It is possible to doubt the wisdom of this stratagem. As will be
discussed below, many countries with which Canada has significant trade
relationships remain appreciably less willing to enforce Canadian
judgments than post-MorguardCanada is to enforce theirs. The problem
may be characterized as a species of iterated prisoner's dilemma in
of the widely voiced concerns about the negative consequences of the global economic development
of the last decade include its alleged role in increasing economic inequalities (both between the
countries of north and south and within nations), its claimed role in creating a race to the bottom in
terms of regulation of matters such as environmental protection and workers' rights, and its erosion
of the nation state's power generally. Given these concerns one might have thought that such longstanding principles of judge-made law as equality, fairness, and protection of weaker parties might
have produced some more restrained statement about how the judge-made law should respond to
internationalization of commercial activity. Conceivably, the Supreme Court might have at least
offered a gesture toward something a little more measured and circumspect than simply placing the
common law so entirely at the service of the globalization of commerce. But it did not.
46 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) appeared to impose a reciprocity requirement, but that

has been discarded: Somportex Ltd. v. PhiladelphiaChewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971)
at 440 n. 8, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
47
K. Clermont, "Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty" (1999) 85 Cornell L. Rev. 89
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which, over the long term, cooperation is rewarded and defection
punished. Therefore, the unilateral-dropping-the-guard tactic is not
irrational. 48 To be fair, perhaps insufficient time has elapsed since
Morguardto permit proper assessment.
B. The Executive
We may never know whether the Morguard approach to creation
of an optimal worldwide enforcement regime might eventually bear fruit,
for the action has now shifted to the executive and bureaucratic realm.
As noted, the United States endured a lack of equivalence in
international judgment enforcement for decades. With the growing
international trade of the 1990s, it began to tire of that. In the words of
one commentator, "[a]s a well-behaved member of the international
community of nations, the United States eagerly gives appropriate
respect to foreign judgements, despite sometimes getting no respect in
return." 4 9 This came to be perceived as being unfair to individual

48 For elaboration of this point, though not from a Canadian angle, see M. Whincop, "The
Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments" (1999) 23
Melbourne U.L Rev. 416.
49 Clermont, supra note 47 at 89. Even a European commentator agrees that, by and large, the
Americans are more welcoming to European judgments than most European countries are to
American ones: J. Zekall, "The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague Judgments
Convention" (1998) 61 Alta. L. Rev. 1283 at 1300. Americans themselves have gone so far as to
assert that there is no country in the world more willing to enforce foreign judgments than the
United States. See R. Brand, "Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The
Economics of Private International Law," in J. Bhandari & A. Sykes, eds., Economic Dimensions in
InternationalLaw: Comparativeand EmpiricalPerspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997) 592 at 604. However, another leading American scholar who conducted a study of how
Canada and the United States treated one another's judgments came to the conclusion that there
was a rough equivalence: R. Weintraub, "Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments and Child
Support Obligations in United States and Canadian Courts" (1999) 34 Tex. Int'l L.J. 361
[hereinafter "Recognition and Enforcement"].
This is not the place to pursue that debate, but a case might be made that post-Morguard
Canada is even more receptive to international judgment recognition than is the United States.
Despite commensurability in many aspects of American and Canadian judgment enforcement
practice, there is one area in which Americans are, as a general rule, not at all welcoming to foreign
judgments: defamation. Largely because of the U.S. Constitution, the United States' substantive law
on this subject differs from that of many other countries. In general, American libel law is
pro-defendant, and American courts have been prepared to export this social policy by not
recognizing foreign libel judgments which reach results contrary to those that would have been
reached had the original action been brought in the United States: see Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702
A. 2d 230 (Md. 1997) and Bachchanv. India Abroad PublicationsInc. 585 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (Supp Ct.
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Americans: "U.S. citizens are being whipsawed."50 That is, the claim
was advanced in that, insofar as foreign judgments were concerned,
Americans51 were being unfairly harmed by an inequality of national
practice. Significantly, this was seen as not only inequitable to individual
Americans (the "whipsawees"), but as a species of trade imbalance
between countries. Under this view, American judgment debtors
responsibly pay off foreign judgment creditors, while American
judgment creditors "tend to be given short shrift in [foreign] courts," 52
generating no equivalent return flow of wealth into the United States.
The situation was perceived as akin to the imbalance of tariffs that
occurred during the 1990s when Americans felt they were suffering as
compared to their trading partners, notably Japan. It was further
claimed that this so-called discriminatory position was of such magnitude
as to amount to "a real threat to American primacy in international
trade." 53 This new trade-law orientation to the question of foreign
judgment enforcement, reinforced by the awareness that the European
Union offered a model of a free trade zone for judgments, is nicely
summed up in the title of one law review article by a leading American
scholar: "How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgment-Recovery
Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?"54
The upshot was that in 1992 the government of the United States
asked the Hague Conference on Private International Law to assume
the task of facilitating the negotiation of a multilateral convention on the

50

Clermont, supranote 47 at 94.

51 More accurately, the individuals (if any) who are unfairly treated are those with exigible
assets present in the United States. Obviously that group is not co-extensive with American citizens,
but the claim that the unfair treatment correlates with American citizenship has greater resonance,
and of course there is sufficient overlap between the two classes to make the claim plausible.

There is a significant issue here. An individual (natural person or corporation) in the
United States might, for example, own property (or shares in a corporation) located in a country
that does not grant ready enforcement to foreign judgments. Such a person, despite being present in
the United States, may be able to benefit from the restrictive enforcement practice of that foreign
country.
52

Clermont, supra note 47 at 94.

53 K. Russell, "Exorbitant Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: The Brussels System
as an Impetus for United States Action" (1993) 19 Syr. J. Int'l L. &. Com. 57 at 80.
54

R. Weintraub, "How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and

What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?" (1998) 24 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 167 [hereinafter "How
Substantial Is Our Need"]. To similar effect see Clermont, supra note 47 at 97, where he expects the
"net benefits of reform" to "yield great returns."
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enforcement of judgments. 55 The request found favour and the
Conference became the forum for talks involving its thirty-six member
states, a number of non-member countries, some intergovernmental
organizations (the United Nations, the European Commission and
others) and also several NGOs (notably the International Chamber of
Commerce). This has consisted of an ongoing series of discussions, study
papers, negotiations and specialized working groups all aiming toward a
worldwide 56 convention on judicial jurisdiction and the enforcement of
foreign court judgments in civil and commercial matters.
IV. THE DRAFT CONVENTION DESCRIBED
A blow-by-blow account of the various meetings and working
groups would require book-length treatment, and even a complete
analysis of all features of the current draft of the convention would be a
lengthy undertaking. However, the current draft's essential elements can
be delineated within a relatively brief compass, as can the problems
underlying the handful of its provisions which remain incomplete and
subject to further negotiation.
The Draft Convention applies to civil and commercial (but not
administrative) matters.5 7 It excludes judgments dealing with revenue,
customs, insolvency, admiralty, social security, succession, matrimonial

55 The process was initiated by a letter from the Department of State to the Hague

Conference in May 1992 (made available by the Hague Conference and distributed with Hague
Conference Document L.c. ON No. 15 (92)). For an account of the steps involved in getting this

matter onto the Conference's agenda, and of the project's early development, see the report by C.
Kessedjian for the Conference: InternationalJurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and

Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law, prel. doc. No. 7 (1997),
online: <http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html> (date accessed: 10 July 2000). And for an
account of Canadian activity in the early years of work on the convention, see L. Lussier, "A
Canadian Perspective" (1998) 24 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 31 at 36-54.

56 We should not fail to note that here, as is commonly the case, the words "worldwide" and
"globalization" are potentially misleading. Just as the so-called worldwide web is not quite a reality

in much of the third world, at present it is mainly the industrialized trading nations that are involved
in the negotiations on the judgments convention. The participants comprise almost all of Western

Europe, some (but not all) of the countries of Eastern Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan,
China, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, and some (but not all) of the countries of South and
Central America. Currently there are no participants from sub-Saharan Africa, the Islamic
countries of the Middle East, or South Asia.
57

The Draft Convention, supra note 15, art. 1.
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property and maintenance. 58 Some of these (maintenance, for
example 59 ) are excluded because they are thought to be dealt with
adequately under existing arrangements; others (revenue, for example)
because their resolution seems unlikely or peripheral to the private law
focus of the enterprise.
Turning from scope to substance, the principal point to note is
that, although the original impetus for the Draft Convention was an
international framework for judgment enforcement, the greatest number
of its terms deal with the formulation of agreed standards of original
adjudicatory jurisdiction. The explanation for the focus on jurisdiction is
that a consensus has emerged that, to the greatest extent possible,
enforcement should correlate with forensic jurisdiction. That is, if it is
possible to arrive at internationally shared rules as to which private law
disputes should be entertained by which country's judiciary, then
resolution of the enforcement question follows easily: matters litigated
and resolved in "the right place" should be given effect everywhere, or at
least in other participating countries; other obstacles to enforcement
being both few and confined.
This parallels the approach to interprovincial enforcement which
the Supreme Court of Canada articulated in Morguard.6O That is not
surprising when one recalls that in opting for correlativity of jurisdiction
and enforcement the Morguard Court was much influenced by the fact
that this was a technique which had been successfully implemented
elsewhere, including within Europe by the Brussels Convention.61 The
Brussels Convention enabled the EU, already a free trade zone for goods
and services, to become a free trade zone for judgments. It is therefore
not surprising to see that treaty's core mechanism-complementarity of
jurisdiction and recognition-become a dominant model for the Hague
project. Indeed, it seems to be the current received wisdom about
transborder enforcement of court judgments that the chief question is
the propriety of the original assertion of jurisdiction (as opposed to, say,
the correctness of the result). If initial jurisdiction can be successfully
allocated among available fora, which is largely a matter of getting all
participants to curtail the breadth of their direct jurisdiction, then

58

Ibid., art. 7.

59 See Convention on the Law Applicable to MaintenanceObligations, 2 October 1973, 1056

U.N.T.S. 199 (entered into force 1 October 1977). This is in force in nineteen member countries of
the Conference-unfortunately, Canada is not among them.
60

Supra note 34.

61 Ibid.

20001

CommodifyingJustice

judgments arising from actions in those places would be enforceable in
all of the other states party to the convention, with very few other
barriers to enforcement. Accordingly, article 25(1) of the draft
judgments convention provides: "A judgment based on a ground of
jurisdiction provided for in articles 3 to 13, or which is consistent with
any such ground, shall be recognized or enforced .... "

The question then becomes, what is the appropriate basis of
general adjudicatory jurisdiction? The basic criterion chosen in the
Hague negotiations is the residence of the defendant. That is, regardless
of where the cause of action arose, of what the cause of action is, or of
other matters (for example, the parties' nationality), a plaintiff is entitled
to seek out a defendant at the defendant's home and bring its action
there. A resulting judgment will then be recognized in other
participating countries. Article 3(1) states: "Subject to the provisions of
the Convention, a defendant may be sued in the courts of the State
where that defendant is habitually resident." As with other Hague
conventions that employ the phrase "habitual residence," that term is
not defined, at least as it applies to natural persons. However, the
residence of corporations is addressed by article 3(2) which facilitates
suits against such defendants by providing an expansive, non-hierarchical
set of options for ascertaining the residence of non-natural persons. At
their option, plaintiffs may sue corporate defendants (1) where the
corporation has its statutory seat, (2) in the jurisdiction under whose law
it was formed, (3) where it has its central administration, or (4) where it
has its principal place of business.
There are three ways in which the Draft Convention qualifies its
general rule that defendants may be sued at their habitual residence.
First, it facilitates party autonomy by providing that persons may agree
in advance to settle their disputes only in a certain country's courts, 62 or
that a defendant may, by appearing and proceeding on the merits, agree
to a plaintiffs choice of court, and that such choices will, with certain
narrow exceptions, be respected. 63

62 The Draft Convention, supra note 15, art. 4. One way in which the Draft Convention's
approach to forum selection clauses differs from current Canadian law is that such clauses are

assumed to confer exclusive jurisdiction unless the parties expressly state otherwise: ibid., art. 4(1).
That is, a contractual clause which reads "the parties agree to resolve their differences in the courts

of Alberta" will under the Draft Convention's approach be assumed to mean "only in the courts of
Alberta." That is not the meaning Canadian courts presently give to such clauses.
63 The Draft Convention's principal limits on contractual choice of law clauses are that they
may derogate neither from the special jurisdictional benefits given to consumers and employees

(infiw, notes 67 and 68), nor from certain mandatory bases of jurisdiction: infra, notes 71 and 22.
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Second, there are a range of supplemental grounds of
jurisdiction. These are in some sense analogous to the criteria in current
Canadian service ex juris rules, but there are two key differences. First,
the Draft Convention's supplementary grofinds of jurisdiction, like all of
its jurisdictional standards, do not turn on where the defendant is
served. 64 Second, on the whole they are narrower than existing Canadian
ex juris rules. The supplemental rules comprise provisions that tort
actions may be brought in the contracting state where the wrongful act
or foreseeable harm occured; 65 that actions in respect of contracts for
goods or services may be brought where the goods or services were
supplied;66 that in consumer contracts consumers have the option to sue
defendant traders at the consumer's habitual residence, at least where
the trader has solicited the consumer in that place and steps have been
taken there to conclude the contract; 67 and that employees have the
option of suing their employers in the state where the employees
habitually carried out their work.68 Actions in respect of trusts may, at
the plaintiff's choice, be brought in the state (1) where the trust is
principally administered, (2) whose law is applicable, or (3) which has
the closest connection with the trust for the purpose of the
proceedings. 69 There is a final provision on supplemental jurisdiction
over defendants based on the fact that they have a branch or
establishment within a jurisdiction or have done business there.
However, the wording of this remains contentious and unresolved, and
will be the subject of further discussion below. 70
64 In this respect the Draft Convention's approach to jurisdiction is like that in the Divorce
Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 3, as am., s. 3. There, territorial jurisdiction is based on one year's
residence of either party in the province where the suit is to be heard. The place where the
respondent is served with the petition is irrelevant: serving him within the province creates no
greater claim to jurisdiction; serving him on the far side of the world results in no lesser one.
65 The Draft Convention, supranote 15, art. 10.
66

Ibid, art.6.

671bid, art. 7(1). As noted supra note 63, art. 7(3) of the Draft Convention overrides general
provision in favour of party autonomy and forbids ex ante contractual modification of this rule.
68 Ibid., art. 8(1)(a)(i). If there is no such state, article 8(1)(a)(ii) provides that the employee
may bring the action in any state where the employer is situated. As with the previous rule dealing
with consumers, the employment contract cannot provide effectively for derogation from this rule.
69

Ibid, art. 11 (2).

70 The relevant provision of the Draft Convention is article 9, which reads:

A plaintiff may bring an action in the courts of a State in which a branch, agency or any
other establishment of the defendant is situated, [or where the defendant has carried on

regular commercial activity by other means,] provided that the dispute relates directly to
the activity of that branch, agency or establishment [or to that regular commercial
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The third way in which the general rule is qualified is that the

Draft Convention prescribes certain rules of mandatory exclusive
jurisdiction. These override both the principle that defendants may
always be sued in the courts of their residence, and the rules that allow

for party autonomy in the choice of forum. They are: (1) that in rem or
lease proceedings in respect of immoveable property must be brought
where the property is situated;71 (2) that actions concerning the validity
of a legal person must be brought in the state whose law governs its
putative existence;7 2 (3) that suits concerning the validity of entries in
public registeries should be brought only where the registry is kept; and
(4) that proceedings relating to the registration or validity of patents,
trade marks, or similar rights must be heard where the registration has
been applied for. 73
It is critical to note that the Draft Convention does more than

just stipulate that judgments rendered in accordance with the foregoing
criteria are entitled to enforcement in other Convention countries.

Rather, states would have to make such jurisdiction available. For
example, Canadian service ex juris rules, which do not typically provide
special jurisdictional advantages for consumers or employees, would
have to be modified so as to ensure that Canadian courts afforded such

jurisdiction.74
activity].
The bracketed sections remain contentious. The question of "doing-business" jurisdiction has a
further aspect. See infra, note 91.
71 Ibid., art. 12(1). The exception is that, where the action concerns a tenancy, the landlord
retains the option to sue the tenant at the tenant's habitual residence. This parallels the existing
Canadian rule originating in British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mogambique, [1893] A.C. 602
(H.L).
72 The Draft Convention, supra note 15, art. 12(2).
73 Or where that registration is deemed to have taken place under the terms of an
international convention: see ibid., arts. 12(3) & (4).
74 It is not my goal here to enumerate all the ways in which Canadian jurisdictional rules might
have to be expanded to accommodate the Convention. However, here is another example: consider
a situation where a party brings suit in a Canadian province in respect of a contract that contains a
choice of forum clause in favour of that province. That province will have jurisdiction over the
action, but it is still open to the defendant to request the court stay or dismiss the action on the
grounds of fonun non conveniens. In such a motion the choice of forum clause will count strongly in
the plaintiffs favour, but the court will retain a discretion to grant the defendant's application: see
Conflict of Laws, supra note 14 at 261-66. Under the convention the court would not be in a position
to decline that jurisdiction: The Draft Convention, supra note 15, arts. 4 and 22(1). In that respect,
Canadian jurisdiction would have to be "broader" than it now is. Note that this broadening of
Canadian jurisdiction, so as to remove judicial discretion to decline it in circumstances where they
are currently entitled to do so, would involve altering a rule which is generally conceived of being
part of the superior court's inherent power to control abuse of its own process.
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The Draft Convention goes beyond simply specifying the
jurisdictional bases state parties are required to afford. It stipulates
circumstances in which a country may not exert jurisdiction. This is key:
states party to the Convention would have to amend their internal law of
original court jurisdiction (i.e., in Canada, both provincial service exjuris
rules and certain common law rules) so as to bring the territorial reach
of their existing adjudicatory jurisdiction within the boundaries imposed
by the Convention. This adjustment would mean eliminating certain
existing jurisdictional grounds viewed as exorbitant. The Convention's
key jurisdictional limit will have a familiar ring: "[T]he application of a
rule of jurisdiction provided for under the national law of a Contracting
State is prohibited if there is no substantial connection between that
State and the dispute." 75
This may seem like nothing more than a nonpleonastic rendering
of Morguard'srequirement that courts may not assert jurisdiction in the
absence of a real and substantial connection, 76 and thus unlikely to
necessitate any amendment to Canadian law, but that is not quite the
case. First, since the Morguardrestriction on direct jurdiction is derived
from the "in the province" limitations in section 92 of the Constitution
Act, 1867,77 it applies to the provinces' courts, but it is not clear that it
binds the Federal Court of Canada. The proposed convention would
govern all Canadian courts. Secondly and more importantly, the Draft
Convention goes on to offer a number of instances of direct jurisdiction
that do not meet its substantial connection test. Some of those banned
grounds are ones currently exercised in Canada and which, moreover,
have been held to satisfy the Morguard test. In particular, the
Convention specifies that jurisdiction may be taken neither on the basis
of the residence of the plaintiff, nor on the basis of service of the writ
upon the defendant in the forum state-two jurisdictional bases said by
Canadian courts to meet the Morguard real and substantial connection
test. 78 Those are not the only items on the forbidden list which appear to
75 The Draft Convention, supra note 15, art. 18(1). This would only apply for defendants
habitually resident in other contracting states. As noted, supra, Part II, the effect of implementing
the proposed convention would be to bifurcate Canadian law on enforcement and jurisdiction.
76

Morguard,supra note 34 at 1104. The test is traceable to Indyka v. Indyka, [1969] 1 A.C. 33

(H.L.), [1967] 2 All. E.R. 689, [1967] 3 WLR 510 (H.L.) cited to A.C. at 105.
77

ConstitutionAct, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 92 (13) & (14), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,

App. II, No. 5.

78 The Draft Convention, supra note 15, arts. 18(2)(d) and (e). In Morguard itself Justice La
Forest said that jurisdiction taken on the basis of the defendant's presence posed no problem for his
substantial connection test: supra note 34 at 1104. Admittedly this was obiter dicta.
-

Likewise a number of Canadian decisions appear to have held that a plaintiff's residence
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clash with the jurisdiction currently asserted by some Canadian
provinces. For instance, the convention provides that a state may not
assert jurisdiction based on the mere signing in that state of the contract
from which the dispute arises. 7 9 This would appear to clash with

Ontario's exjuris rule (and similar ones in several other provinces) which
permits service ex juris "in respect of a contract where ...
the contract
80
was made in Ontario ....-

Despite the previously adduced examples of the ways in which
Canadian adjudicatory jurisdiction would have to be expanded to accord

with the Draft Convention, the more signficant changes-and the net
effect on Canadian jurisdictional reach-would be a contraction to bring

Canadian jurisdiction into line with the convention's substantial
connection standard. Canadian courts would thus be entitled to hear a

smaller range of cases than is permitted under existing rules, but
judgments resulting from such suits would be entitled to easier
enforcement than they now are.

in the forum will satisfyMorguard'ssubstantial connection standard: Dennis v. Salvation Army Grace
GeneralHospital Board et al. (1997), 156 N.S.R. (2d) 372 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused
[1997] 2 S.C.R. xiii (sub nom. Pike v. Dennis);Parev. Halldorson (1996), 150 Sask. R. 96 (Q.B.); and
Oakley v. Bany (1998), 158 D.L.R. (4th) 679 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [1998] 2
S.C.R. v. Note, there are also cases going the other way, for example, MacDonaldv. Lasnier (1994),
21 O.R. (3d) 177 (Gen. Div.). I have argued elsewhere in favour of the view in the last-mentioned
case: V. Black, "Territorial Jurisdiction Based on the Plaintiffs Residence" (1998) 14 C.P.C. (4th)
222.
79 The Draft Convention, supranote 15, art. 18(2)().
80 Rules of Civil Procedure, Ontario, Rule 17.02(f)(i). For another instance of a common
Canadian ex juris rule which likely offends the banned grounds of jurisdiction in the Draft
Convention, consider Ontario's r. 17.02(o) (and its equivalent in most other provinces) which
permits service exjuris "against a person outside Ontario who is a necessary or proper party to a
proceeding properly brought against another person served in Ontario ... ." It is by no means clear
that, just because there is justifiable assertion of jurisdiction over A and that under our rules of
joinder B is a proper party to that action, assertion of jurisdiction over B is permitted under the
convention. In short, rules such as Ontario's r. 17.02(o) have the potential in certain cases to run
afoul of the convention's substantial connection standard.
As with the ways in which Canadian jurisdictional rules would have to be erpanded to accord
with the convention (see supra note 74) I have not attempted to be exhaustive about the ways in
which those rules would have to be curtailed. The point is that they would have to be rewritten
substantially.
In this connection it should be noted that in the United States, where (like Canada)
enforcement of foreign country judgments has hitherto been a matter mainly for the states and not
the federal government, the American Law Institute is proposing that, should the Convention be
concluded and the United States choose to implement it, it should be implemented by a federal
statute. See the ALl Report, supra note 15 at xv and 18-19, and L. Silberman and A. Lowenfeld, "A
Different Challenge for the ALl: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International Treaty,
and an American Statute" (2000) 75 Ind. L.J. at 635. It is interesting to speculate on whether the
Canadian Constitution would permit comparable federal legislative action.
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Five additional features of the Draft Convention should be
noted. First, jurisdiction and enforcement would not be completely
correlative. Bases of original jurisdiction that are neither required nor
prohibited would be permitted.81 However, resulting judgments would
not be guaranteed recognition in other contracting states (though such
states could choose to enforce them if they wished). Second, the
convention specifies certain exceptional circumstances in which courts
may decline to exercise a jurisdiction given to them under it. If
implemented this would amount to a legislative forum non conveniens
power. However, the version in the Draft Convention provides less scope
for declining jurisdiction than does the current Canadian forum non
conveniens test. If the court's jurisdiction is conferred neither by contract
nor by one of the convention's provisions for exclusive jurisdiction, then
the court may suspend its proceedings if, and only if, (1) it is clearly
inappropriate for that court to exercise jurisdiction, (2) another court
has jurisdiction, and (3) it is clearly more appropriate for that other
court to resolve the dispute.8 2 Third, the Convention has a section on
provisional and protective measures which guarantees recognition on
roughly the same grounds as final judgments. As a result, a worldwide
Mareva injunction issued on an interim basis by a Canadian court that
had appropriate jurisdiction would have to be recognized by other
convention countries. 83 Fourth, even under the Convention, states would
retain the power that exists in most national systems (including
Canada's) to refuse to enforce foreign judgments that are obtained by
procedural fraud or that are incompatible with their public policy.8 4
Finally, in respect of those portions of damages awards that are "noncompensatory" (a term which includes, but is not limited to punitive
awards), contracting states are not required to enforce them beyond the
amount they themselves could have awarded in non-compensatory
damages. 85 A similar provision allows courts to decline those portions of
damages awards which are shown to be "grossly excessive." 86

81 The Draft Convention, supranote 15, art. 17.
82 Ibid., art. 22. Likewise article 21 is a provision on alibipendenswhich is comparable to the
common law on that point, but provides considerably greater preference to the first court seized.
83
Ibid., art. 13.
84 Ibid, art. 28.
85 Ibid., art. 33(1). It is not clear, for example, whether non-compensatory damages awards
would include those where damages are measured by the gain to the defendant, rather than the loss
to the plaintiff.
86
Ibid, art. 33(2).
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These last-mentioned matters point to reservations that many of
the negotiating states have about judgments emanating from the United
States. These concerns exist even when the original (American)
assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction conforms to the Convention's
standards. In that connection it is worth focusing more closely on the
American situation, since much of the negotiations have assumed a
United States versus Rest of the World (ROW) flavour, and appreciating
that dynamic is crucial to understanding both the nature of the existing
draft of the convention and the still unresolved issues on which the
project might easily fail. One might have thought that, because the
United States (like post-Morguard Canada) has by unilateral judicial
action already lowered its barriers to enforcement of foreign country
judgments, the U.S. would come to this process with fewer bargaining
chips than its economic power typically gives it in international
negotiations.8 7 After all, if the United States already enforces most
foreign country judgments, what, apart from appeals to fair play, would
induce ROW (also known as the "whipsawers") to do the same? In light
of this, one American scholar has suggested that the United States get
tough on foreign judgments-that is, revise its recognition rules to
resemble more closely ROW's, thus giving itself greater leverage in the
Hague negotiations.88
But the Americans do have bargaining chips. The courts of
several of the United States have a jurisdictional reach that permits
them to entertain actions with which they appear to have little
connection, for example, suits in which neither of the parties is an
American citizen or resident and where the cause of action did not arise
in the United States. Such jurisdiction can be asserted on the basis that
the defendant does business-for example, has (or even had) a branch
operation-in the forum state, even if the cause of action has nothing to
do with the activities of that branch.89 Moreover, there are a variety of
explanations for why foreign plaintiffs are commonly inclined to seek out
such fora. These include broad pre-trial discovery, contingency fee
arrangements, the availability of punitive damages, high damages awards
for pain and suffering, the possibility of a jury trial, and certain attractive
87

A view espoused by Clermont, supra note 47 at 94-95.

88 "How Substantial Is Our Need," supra note 54 at 178. For another recent example of
American legal scholarship seeking to contribute to the bargaining process, this time by trying to
convince ROW to modify its demands, see R. Brand, "Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague
Judgments Convention" (1999) 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 661.
89 The propriety of such jurisdiction, as asserted by Texas, was at issue in Amchem Products
Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' CompensationBoard), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897.
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features of American substantive law, such as a greater (i.e., greater than
ROW) willingness to disregard corporate personality. In the oft-quoted
words of Lord Denning, "[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant
drawn to the United States." 90
Moreover, it is by no means the case that foreign persons
impleaded as defendants in such actions are always able to disregard
them. That is, although such defendants are sometimes in a position to
remain at home in ROW, ignore the American proceedings and benefit
from their own country's barriers to foreign judgment recognition,
frequently they cannot because they have branch operations or some
other property in the United States. That is, although both the plaintiff
and defendant might have their principal operations in ROW, and
although the suit between them might have arisen out of their
interaction there, if the defendant has assets in the United States then
the American judgment will be enforceable against these and there will
be no need for the plaintiff to confront the prospect that ROW is
unwelcoming to American judgments. The simple fact is that many
corporations resident elsewhere in the world do want to have branch
plants, offices, or business property in the United States in order to
trade in that market.
It is not my intent to cast apersions on the United States for the
reach of its long arm jurisdiction. Other countries, Canada among them,
have bases of direct jurisdiction which are arguably exorbitant. However,
when you combine the broad jurisdiction of some of the United States
with (1) the above-noted attractions of the American civil litigation
landscape, and (2) the fact that a percentage of resulting judgments will
be collectable even against nonresident defendants due to their having
property in the United States, the overbreadth of American jurisdiction
is an irritant to ROW and thus, in the context of the Hague process,
amounts to a stack of American bargaining chips of nontrivial height. As
a result, an important dynamic of the negotiations has been how much
the United States will be prepared to give up in terms of reining in its
wide jurisdictional rules, in return for obtaining easier enforcement of
90 Smith Kline & FrenchLaboratoriesLtd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (C.A.), [1983] 2 All.
E.R. 72 (C.A.) cited to W.L.R. at 733. The phrase is typically colourful, but for three reasons
perhaps less than accurate. First, as a rule it is not litigants, but rather plaintiffs who experience the
attraction; in general, foreign defendants would prefer to avoid the United States. Second, it is not
the United States as a whole that is the object of the putative attraction, but rather certain magnet
fora, such as Texas. Third, the leading theory of lepidopteran phototaxis posits that moths are not
attracted to light, but rather to the dark Mach bands which they perceive to surround the light: H.
Hsiao, Attraction of Moths to Light and Infrared Radiation (San Francisco: San Francisco Press,

1972) at 34-55. It might then perhaps have been more accurate for the Master of the Rolls to write
that plaintiffs are attracted to some American states like flies to dung.
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(the remainder of) its court judgments in countries that today do not
readily recognize them. Indeed, should the Draft Convention founder, it
will almost certainly be on this very point. This brings us back to the
unresolved supplemental grounds of jurisdiction alluded to above, 91
which is perhaps the crucial sticking point in the negotiations. The
United States is reluctant to abandon so-called "doing-business"
jurisdiction. This is the power that some of its states' courts are prepared
to exercise over defendants who, although they are resident elsewhere
and the cause of action has arisen elsewhere, have business operations in
those states. Conversely, ROW is reluctant to agree to a convention that
does not require the United States to abandon this ground of
jurisdiction. How that will resolve itself remains to be seen. Quite
conceivably, the agreement will prove to be out of reach.
V. THE STAKES FOR CANADA AND THE DISCOURS(ES)
OF GLOBAL COMMERCIAL JUSTICE
In light of uncertainties surrounding the outcome of the Hague
project it is instructive to consider the Canadian position. Viewed as a
matter of wins and losses to countries, Canada may well have more at
stake in this process than any other participant. As noted, like the
United States (and unlike much of ROW) Canada is already relatively
willing to enforce foreign court judgments, including American ones.
There is thus a flow of wealth out of the country. Also, like the United
States, Canada may not enjoy an equivalent return flow from ROW. In
short, Canadians too feel the whipsaw's bite. However, unlike the United
States, Canada gets few compensating benefits from being an appealing
centre for worldwide commercial litigation. While some Texas law firms
may be doing good business conducting contingency fee litigation on
causes of action that arise on the far side of the world, no Canadian law
firm is. Admittedly no empirical studies quantify the resulting harm to
Canada from non-equivalence in the judgment-enforcement market, or

91 Supra note 70. The problem goes beyond the difficulty in defining branch-activity
jurisdiction. Several American states assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants who do business in
those states, even when the cause of action does not arise from that business activity within the
state. Although it is settled that such jurisdiction will not be among the jurisdictional grounds that

states are required to have, what is not settled is whether it should be among the banned grounds.
The current Draft Convention suggests that it should be: supra note 15, art. 18 (2)(e). However, the
United States has suggested it will not go along with that: see the ALI Report, supra note 15 at 13-15.
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even verify that such loss exists.92 Yet, intuitively it appears to be much
in Canada's interests that the Draft Convention be successfully
concluded (regardless of how the contentious issue of doing-business
jurisdiction is resolved). But, despite this interest, by this point it will be
obvious that Canada has even less bargaining power in the Hague
judgment convention discussions than its mid-range economic power
typically gives it in international trade negotiations. Evidently, Canada
can do nothing except sit on the sidelines and hope that the United
States and ROW reach some compromise.
In the face of this, it is interesting to return for a moment to
Jean-Gabriel Castel's Canadian Bar Review article quoted in the
introduction. 93 There, Castel described the Hague process and urged
Canada (successfully, as it turned out) to join in that work. His account
of how things worked at the Hague did not paint a picture of states
engaged exclusively in self-interested trade negotiations. Rather, he
noted that "the objectives of the Convention are not of a political
nature" 94 and that its work was scientific and impartial. He wrote: "A
seminar-like atmosphere prevails and the exchange of ideas that takes
place among the men from nations where different legal systems are in
force, usually results in the adoption of very constructive solutions to the
problems under study." 95 Castel was not oblivious to the fact that states'
ultimate decisions about whether to adopt any given product of the
Conference were political. No one could be so naive as to think
otherwise. In addition, one would expect that the experts sent by various
states to negotiate Hague conventions would be aware of their own
countries' political preferences and economic stakes in the matters
before the Conference. But Castel was observing that the discourse
employed in hammering out Hague conventions was that of lawyers
pursuing principled solutions, not of states engaged in horse trading.
92 There is no shortage of comparative assessments of judgment enforcement rules, such as
that of Weintraub in "Rocognition and Enforcement," supra note 49, but those focus on legal
doctrine. Empirical studies of gains and losses resulting to countries from such doctrinal differences
seem not to exist. A particular difficulty in conducting any such study is that the true measure of
losses would have to include those from ex ante decisions made about where to do business. For
example, a business entity might decide to set up its somewhere in ROW rather than in Canada,
basing its decision (at least in part) on expected gains and losses associated with the judgment
enforcement situation I have just described. The loss to Canada would then flow from that entity
not bringing its capital here in the first place. Ascertaining the existence, frequency, and resulting
effect of such decisions seems a near impossible task.
93 "Canada and the Hague,"supranote 11 at 8.
94

Ibid. at 8.

95 Ibid. at 7.
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Certainly many of Canada's subsequent labours at the Conference have
been of that nature. The conventions on international child abduction
and international adoption, as projects which sought to fulfil
commitments arising from the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child,96 were certainly of that character. None of this accords
easily with the way I have described the judgments convention, either in
its inception or in the current impasse.
Let us specify two models for the way the negotiation of a
multilateral convention on judgment enforcement might be conducted.
The matter of cross-border enforcement may be seen as a matter of
justice, both between potential parties to a private law suit and between
the states connected with their activity. Take, for example, a person
injured at her home in state A by a product manufactured in state B by
X Ltd. Defining the circumstances in which that injured person should
be able to sue X Ltd. in state A and then enforce any resulting judgment
against X Ltd.'s property in B is something which can be approached
both in terms of fairness between the parties and justified assertion of
territorial jurisdiction by states. Of course different national legal
systems will initially generate different resolutions to the problem, but
the creation of international standards 6n the matter may still be
conducted as a disinterested search for broadly shared norms or for new
common grounds of international justice, much as Castel described
above.
Alternatively, the matter might be viewed as one of international
trade. Under this conception, court judgments are commodities-a sort
of "justice product," much like a good or a service. Countries are no
more obliged to allow foreign judgments past their borders (i.e.,
recognize them) than they are required to admit foreign manufactured
goods. Of course they may choose to recognize them, but since this
option typically involves an outflow of wealth they may be reluctant to
do so. They will confront the recognition question much as they do the
question of whether they should lower their tarriffs on goods and
services. This problem is not in any respect a principled one, but rather a
bargaining process wherein states are rational self-maximizers. As such,
they appreciate that there are efficiency gains to be made by the removal
of barriers and that their own self-interest requires that such removal be
reciprocal-thus, the establishment of the WTO. This does not imply
that it is impossible for justice factors-for example, concerns over
human rights, labour standards, or environmental regulation-to bear
96 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3 (entered into

force 2 September 1990, accession by Canada 13 December 1991).
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on trade issues. However, the dominant model in the 1990s has been for
the free trade versus fair trade debate to become polarized, with
advocates of the latter finding themselves in the streets (and jails) of
Seattle rather than at its negotiating tables.
One might have predicted that in the case of something like the
judgments convention-where what is being traded across international
borders is not goods or services but is itself "a justice product"-justice
discourse would come to the fore and negotiations would not reach an
impasse on issues of admitted state self-interest. This is especially the
case where the negotiating forum is the Hague Conference with its
history of disinterested, apolitical, scientific inquiry. In light of that, the
fact that negotiation of the Hague judgments convention has fallen into
a trade law mould, may be yet more evidence of the expansion of law
and economics discourse in private law matters and of the hegemony of
trade discourse in national and international affairs. One possible
response to this is an o tempora, o mores lament. However, it should be
noted that there are examples of Hague Conference conventions which
have been successfully negotiated but never implemented, or at least not
widely so. Arguably, this is due to an overly scholarly orientation at the
creation of those conventions, with insufficient attention to realpolitikat
the negotiation and drafting stage.97
In any event, should the Hague project fail there is reason to
think Canada should consider unilaterally revising its rules on foreign
judgment enforcement. A possible response would be to provide for
increased barriers to recognition, conceivably even a reciprocity
requirement: if ROW cannot be persuaded to lower its restrictions on
recognition of foreign judgments in the Hague process, where it would
get something in return, then it seems unlikely it will soon take up the
Morguard invitation to do so unilaterally in a spirit of comity. At the
same time Canada could seek a bilateral arrangement with the United
States to preserve the relatively liberal judgment enforcement picture
that presently exists between those two countries.9 8 The issue of
judgment enforcement would have been thrust firmly into a trade law
framework, with little immediate opportunity of returning to any other
conception of the problem.

97 This may explain the lack of success of the earlier Hague convention on judgment
enforcement: supranote 22.
98 In this connection it should be noted that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada has for
several years been working on a model Uniform Enforcement of ForeignJudgmentsAct. Part of the
impetus for this model statute is the trade imbalance in the judgment enforcement market that
emerged in the post-Morguardera.

